La fundamentación del "rule of law" en el liberalismo constructivista de John Rawls

Abstract

The following work assesses the relation between the observance of the desiderata that constitute the formal conceptions of the rule of law and the promotion of the freedom of the legal subjects. This evaluation will be developed on the basis of the thought of John Rawls, one of the most influential liberal philosophers of the 20th century. The study starts with the exposition of the formal conception of the rule of law held by Rawls, as well as his ideas concerning formal justice, closely related with the rule of law. In order to strengthen the understanding of the aforementioned conception, this will be complemented with the exposition of the proposal of Lon L. Fuller, given its influence in the ideas of Rawls. Following this, there is an analysis of the Rawlsian conception of freedom, which evaluates the moral powers of a free person and the different interpretations held by Rawls in his comprehensive liberal proposal and his political liberal proposal. Having done this, the arguments used to defend the recognition of the freedom generated by the respect of the rule of law are detailed. Finally, there is an exposition of the criticism of those arguments.