Derogación de la rotación obligatoria de auditores y calidad de auditoría

  1. Ruiz Barbadillo, Emiliano
  2. Gómez Aguilar, María Nieves
  3. Carrera Pena, Nieves
Revista:
Revista de economía aplicada

ISSN: 1133-455X

Año de publicación: 2009

Volumen: 17

Número: 49

Páginas: 105-134

Tipo: Artículo

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Otras publicaciones en: Revista de economía aplicada

Resumen

El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar el impacto de la rotación obligatoria de firmas en la calidad de la auditoría. Dos argumentos opuestos han alimentado el debate sobre la conveniencia de esta medida. Sus defensores argumentan que esta medida refuerza la independencia del auditor y, por tanto, incrementa la calidad de la auditoría. Sus detractores, en cambio, opinan que la rotación destruye el conocimiento específico del auditor y reduce los incentivos a competir en el mercado, disminuyendo la calidad del servicio. La rotación cada nueve años fue obligatoria en España desde 1988 hasta 1995, por lo que contamos con un contexto único para obtener evidencia empírica sobre los efectos de esta norma. Se contrastan dos hipótesis opuestas sobre el impacto de la derogación de la norma sobre la probabilidad del auditor de emitir informes con salvedades por gestión continuada. La muestra está formada por empresas cotizadas españolas con deterioro financiero observadas en un régimen con rotación obligatoria (1991-1994) y sin ella (1995-2000). Los resultados muestran que la derogación de la rotación obligatoria incrementa la probabilidad del auditor de emitir informes con salvedades por gestión continuada, por tanto, se obtienen evidencias empíricas que apoyan los argumentos de los detractores de la rotación.

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