Personas y cosas en el plano medio del derecho

Abstract

The modern tendency of metaphysically consider things in and of itself, regardless of the circumstances (a way of studying the reality that began in its most extreme version of the Spanish Jesuits in the early seventeenth century) has led to a strange unit Rentification of the concept of law. Reading Kelsen, Rawls or Habermas, it is perceived that they think of law as something that can be defined globally, just as a physical body; the right would be practically a tangible reality known in one concept, and the first temptation has been to provide a legal concept -¡ the nineteenth-century chimera of the search for the "concept of law"! - which itself and their own virtues, eject uniformly regulated or equally for all cases, any possible injustice. In this article the author seeks to discuss people and things in the middle plan of law because the author of these pages is convinced that human beings have rights because is a person, and does not accept that they are the people that owe their condition to arguments that they themselves do; and, as to this issue, refers to the nature of these constructs that give us many rights, for watches that if there are human rights, the quality of humanness is not derived from the logical-abstract constructions, once the author of some of these theories is a human being.