An ever-closer union? towards a comprehensive approach of the european disintegration process

Zusammenfassung

The objective of my thesis focused on answering the question of whether the crises experienced since 2010 -eurozone crisis, the migration crisis, Brexit and Ukraine war- have caused evidences of European disintegration and, if so, what are the explanatory factors. The question that this thesis aims at answering has not been comprehensive replied hitherto by scholars’ international public law, international relations, political science or sociology. European integration was considered an irreversible process until a few years ago. Facts such as the consolidation of the common currency or the increase in the number of States that are part of the EU were indicators that led scholars to assume that the EU would increasingly assume more competences at the expense of national institutions from Member States. Crises had always been present in the EU since its formation, so one would consider that the following crisis would be just one more. However, the crises that have occurred from 2010 to date have constituted a danger because it jeopardizes the legislative framework, based on supranational agreements, European policies and inter-state projects, that seemed irreversible has been questioned, such as the Schengen Area or the eurozone. The question arises about what is new about the EU going through difficulties if there have been different crises since its foundation. In my opinion, since 2010 the polycrisis that the EU has faced have differential characteristics with respect to those experienced previously, which has caused a turning point in the European integration process unknown to date. In the first place, the crises have put at risk the most deeply rooted supranational policies of the EU, such as monetary union or the free movement of people. Second, the crises have taken place in a very limited time frame. The third differential aspect of the crises that I analyze in this doctoral dissertation refers to the particularity of its legal instruments adopted as a response to deal with the crisis. The fourth differential aspect is the emergence of new cleavages. To sum up, the EU has gone through moments of deep crisis since its foundation. Delors already advanced the idea that “Europe will be forged in crises, and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises.”. Until 2009 that omen was true, as the EU overcame difficulties in the political, economic and institutional spheres. However, the EU is facing an unprecedented crisis scenario since, for the first time in its history, several crises have occurred continuously in a short period of time, pillars of European integration that were untouchable until now have been put at risk, EU mechanism have been activated after twenty years since its adoption, non-EU instruments have been used, new cleavages have emerged between States and the highest levels of Euroscepticism have been reached among citizens. The research question is to determine if -and why- the economic, migratory and Brexit crises have caused a reinforcement of the integration process or if have caused signs of a setback in the integration process. My contribution to the academic debate focuses on four fields. First, I assess the economic, migratory and Brexit crises from the legal and political perspective. Second, I explore the incidence of the aforementioned crises in the sectorial, vertical and horizontal dimensions of the integration process. Third, I discuss to what extent the crises have deepened or undermined the integration process and I move on to discuss what are the underlying implications that straightaway affect the backbone of EU values as the defense of human dignity, the representative democracy, the human rights protection, the upholding of the rule of law and the principle of accountability and transparency. Finally, I develop a set of explanatory factors that justify why the crises have caused different results in the integration process. By doing so, I propose a systematic explanatory model that allows EU scholars and researchers to comprehend, both in the present and in the future, why certain crises cause disintegration and why others reinforce the integration process. This thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter address the Eurozone crisis and consists of six sections. In the first section I explore the events that led to the Eurozone crisis and examine what has been the contribution to the integration process of the new supranational instruments of economic policy. To continue, I address the regulatory, political and economic context. Later on, I explore the main characteristic of the renewed economic governance of the EU. Subsequently, I examine the consequences of the Eurozone crisis in relation to the disintegration process in its three dimensions. I conclude that the authority of European institutions has been strengthened, except for the European Parliament. The institution that has benefited the most from the increase in the vertical dimension of European integration is the ECB. The authority of the European Council and the Council of the EU has also been clearly reinforced as a result of the economic crisis. The CJEU has played a preponderant role in the field of economic and monetary policy, so its authority in this field has grown exponentially. To sum up, I highlight the following relevant findings. I verify an increase in the vertical dimension of the European integration process. In the sectorial dimension, there has been a deepening to the extent that there is an increase in the areas over which the EU exercises its governance. An example of this have been the adoption of financial aid mechanisms, the compliance with excessive deficit obligations and the communitisation of banking supervision. In the horizontal dimension, from the beginning of the eurozone crisis to the present, not only has the number of States not been reduced, but it has increased. Afterward, I evaluate the explanatory variables, namely, high costs and interdependence and the unbalanced role of the ECB, Germany and the Eurogroup. To continue, I discuss the implications of the integration process for the future of the EU. In addition to verifying a greater integration, I identify underlying consequences such as the reinforcement of the intergovernmental bias of the Union, the detriment of the values of publicity and accountability and the deepening of the differences between States as a result of budgetary stability policies. Finally, I address the most important conclusions and review the main findings. The second chapter focuses on examining the migration crisis and is divided into six sections. In the first place, I delve into the normative and jurisprudential framework that covers the construction of the Schengen Area up to 2020. In the second section I evaluate the regulatory and jurisprudential framework. To continue, I explore the social and political context since 2010 until 2020. In particular, I investigate the implications of non-compliance with the European Commission Plan to relocate asylum seekers, what effects the reintroduction of the internal borders of the EU had on the free movement of persons and to what extent the EU-Turkey Agreement prevents European Courts from ensuring the protection of fundamental rights. Next, I address to what extent the migratory crisis has affected the vertical, sectoral and horizontal dimensions of the integration process. My research confirms that the authority of the European institutions has been seriously undermined. In the vertical dimension, the migration crisis confirms that there have been evidences of disintegration to the extent that it has been verified a weakening of the European Commission and the CJEU. Related to the sectorial dimension, there has been a reversal in the integration process to the extent that there has been a renationalization of the powers linked to the reintroduction of border controls between Member States. In the horizontal dimension, that there has been no reduction in the number of States that form part of the EU's migration policies, although many Member States have infringed EU migration and asylum law. In the following section, I move on to evaluate the explanatory factors, namely, lack of will on the part of the Member States to respond to the migratory crisis and the inability of the EU to enforce its mandates as a result of dysfunctional distribution of powers, the absence of a European mediator and the lack of mechanisms in case of violation of the law. To continue I analyze the underlying consequences of the migration crisis. I argue that the disintegration in the area of migration and asylum has led to the weakening of the rule of law of the EU and that the high politicization in the field of migration has introduced positions contrary to the reception of asylum seekers in mainstream parties. Finally, I sum up the most relevant conclusions. In the third chapter I study the implications for the European integration process of the withdrawal of the UK. For this, the chapter is structured in five sections. In the first section I succinctly explore the factors that led to the withdrawal of the UK, the country's trajectory in its 47 years of permanence, the call for the Brexit referendum and the analysis of its result. In the second section, I focus on evaluating the negotiations between the EU and the UK to make the withdrawal effective, paying special attention to the analysis of article 50 of the TEU, the asymmetric positions of the EU and the UK in the negotiation and the role of the European institutions. To continue, in the third section, I examine to what extent the vertical, sectoral and horizontal dimensions of European integration have been affected by Brexit. Among the most significant findings, I empirically verify that the authority of the EU has been reinforced because the Member States have gathered their powers over the negotiation process at the European institutions, renouncing intergovernmental agreements. In the sectorial dimension, the governance areas have not decreased… but there have been difficulties in implementing other supranational public policies. Regarding the horizontal dimension, for the first time in history, there has been a reduction in the number of States that are part of the EU. In the fourth section, I assess the explanatory variables of the result of the withdrawal of the UK on the integration process, such as cohesion between the Member States within the community institutions and the weakness of the UK’s position in the negotiation. Next, I formulate the underlying consequences that the UK's withdrawal has had for the future of UE. I argue that Brexit constitutes an opportunity to strengthen the European project is highlighted, that the EU institutions should have defended the European integration more decisively and that the normalization of relations between the UK and the EU remains a long-term pending task. Finally, I collect the main conclusions. After dedicating three chapters to analyze the crises that occurred between 2010 and 2020, I review the consequences of the Ukraine conflict regarding European integration. I analyze the EU's response to the war in Ukraine. Next, I examine how the Russian invasion has affected the dimensions of integration. In the vertical dimension, the authority of the European institutions has been strengthened. In the sectoral dimension, not only greater integration -because the because unusual measures have been adopted to date- but “better” integration -because the European standards of public decision-making have been protected and promoted-. As for horizontal integration, all Member States are acting cooperatively to help Ukraine, with the exception of Hungary. On the other hand, although the possibility of Ukraine joined the EU is reinforced, its path to membership is not an easy task. To continue, I address what are the factors that explain the rapid and forceful position of the EU. The main explanatory factor that has allowed such response is the political will. There has not been a war crisis in the history of the EU where the Member States have been more collaborative. The second explanatory factor, closely linked to the first, is public opinion. To conclude, I reflect on the implications of the war in Ukraine for the EU in terms of its role in the field of foreign and security policy. Finally, I conclude by identifying the main findings of the research and reviews its most relevant contributions to the academic debate on European disintegration. In the first place, it is confirmed that two of the crises -Eurozone and the war in Ukraine- have caused a reinforcement of the integration process while the other two -migration and Brexit- have caused evidences of disintegration. Second, the explanatory factors that justify the existence of such notable differences between the crises are compiled, analyzed, systematized and compared. Throughout the thesis I have detected relevant findings that allow establishing certain patterns that explain the uneven results of different crises on the European integration process. In the first place, when all the Member States agree that there is a common supranational objective to protect and promote that prevails over their national interests, there is a greater probability that decision-making will be executed in the European sphere and it have a high level of compliance. On the contrary, when there is no common good to protect or the cost of unprotecting it is not high, States tend to make their internal priorities prevail, undermining the progress made in the European arena. Secondly, the more binding, mandatory and conditional law instruments that are adopted, the greater the deepening in European integration will be. The adoption of soft law instruments, non-binding recommendations or agreements outside EU law, which are not subject to the legal control by the CJEU, are more likely to cause setbacks in the European integration process. Thirdly, the higher the degree of politicization of a public policy and the more it touches on matters of national sovereignty (such as identity, culture, values…), the less likely the EU is to get involved in decision-making on those. On the contrary, if the national governments, in response to the demands of part of the citizenry, consider that an issue should be regulated by the European institutions, it is very feasible for the EU to act on this matter by legislating from a supranational perspective. However, when traditionally pro-European integration political parties show acquiesce to the criticism made by Eurosceptic political parties, the EU maintains a more limited regulatory agenda. The existence of strong leadership, whether from a Member State, a European institution or a supranational negotiator, is also vital to ensure progress in European integration. If there is a lack of leadership at the European level, national preferences are more likely to prevail. Finally, the potential risk of contagion is an incentive for Member States and European institutions to adopt supranational decisions to protect the advances in European integration that are aligned with their national objectives. The crises experienced from 2010 to date are an excellent lesson to invigorate and strengthen the European integration project in the coming years. I am fully convinced that it is necessary to boost the European integration process during the following years. Thus, it would be appropriate to foster a supranational regulatory framework in various governance areas, among which, in my opinion, the following stand out. First, promoting a more vocal role for the EU. To this extent, it is essential from an internal perspective for the European institutions to be less tolerant of Eurosceptic political groups or national Governments so that their discourse does not permeate future generations nor encourage racist and xenophobic attitudes. From an external perspective, it would be convenient for the EU to defend its governance model in an increasingly globalized world. Second, to achieve a greater commitment to the safeguarding of human rights. The EU was created to overcome a war that divided the continent, so it is incomprehensible that a part of Europeans is indifferent to those fleeing conflict. The values of solidarity and cooperation, not only between Member States, but towards any person, regardless of his or her origin, race, sex or religion, should be the driving force behind European migration and asylum policies. People fleeing war, regardless of where they come from -Ukraine, Libya, Congo, Yemen... or anywhere in the world- require the same European protection standards that guarantee them a decent life. Third, from the economic and social perspective, it would be appropriate to advance in regulatory proposals that, without impeding the competitiveness of businesses, that foster social inclusion and diversity with the objective so often mentioned by the European institutions of ensuring “no one is left behind” and fight discrimination. Those who have a less advantageous position due to geographical origin, sex, age or education must continue to be at the center of public policy. Otherwise, inequality between Europeans will continue to increase. Finally, and most relevant in my judgement, it is essential to defend European principles that are inexcusable. The EU was created to be an international organization for dialogue and reflection on issues that affect us as European citizens in our day-to-day lives. However, there are principles that should not be the subject of debate or questioning, all of them linked to the defence of democracy and the rule of law. The protection of fundamental rights and non-discrimination, free and fair elections, the freedom of expression and information, judicial independence and the primacy of EU law over national law including constitutional provisions are structural pillars of European integration that must be protected and promoted. By tolerating attitudes contrary to the rule of law on the part of any Member State, there is a risk of a potential authoritarian drift that will attack the foundations of the entire integration process.